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Research Article Open access CC BY 4.0

Game Behavior of Negative Public Opinion in Colleges and Universities and Its Rectification and Optimization

Yuwan Huang

Asian Journal of Education and Social Studies · pp. 39–45 · Published 9 Aug 2023

10.9734/ajess/2023/v48i21051

Abstract

Aims: With the development of the Internet, more and more public opinion events in colleges and universities attract people's attention. Using the game theory method to analyze the public opinion events in colleges and universities, it can effectively improve the benefit of students and the degree of emphasis on the rectification of negative public opinion. Methodology: The problem of negative public opinion in colleges and universities mainly involves four interest subjects: students, colleges and universities, and government supervision departments. Based on the thought of game theory, this paper studies the game behavior among government, students and universities under the condition of information asymmetry from the goal of university rectification and optimization. Conclusion: The analysis of the game Nash equilibrium found that improving the rectification cost of non-action in dealing with negative public opinion in colleges and universities and reducing the cost of supervision by government departments can effectively improve the benefit of students and the degree of emphasis on rectification in colleges and universities.

Game nash equilibrium negative public opinion colleges and universities

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