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Research Article Open access CC BY 4.0

A 3-Person Non-Zero-Sum Game for Sachet Water Companies

Ngutor Nyor, Muhammad Izhar Muazu, Samuel Abu Somma

Asian Research Journal of Mathematics · pp. 66–75 · Published 24 Jun 2022

10.9734/arjom/2022/v18i830398

Abstract

The business of Sachet water (popularly called pure water) in Nigeria is often competitive due to the high demand for Sachet water by the populace. This is so because sachet water is the most affordable form of pure drinking water in Nigeria. As such, Sachet Water Firms that want to succeed in an ever increasing competitive market need to have the knowledge of Game Theory to identify which strategy will yield better profit independent of the strategy adopted by other competitors. This paper is aimed to investigate and determine the equilibrium point for three Sachet Water Firms using the Nash Equilibrium Method as it provides a systematic approach for deciding the best strategy in competitive situation. The result showed two Nash Equilibriums (promo, promo) and (stay-put, stay-put) with their respective payoffs of (82; 82; 82) and (147; 147; 147).

Game theory sachet water 3-person non-zero sum best response nash equilibrium Pareto-optimal pareto-dominated

Cited by 1

3-Player 3-Strategy Nash Equilibruim of Party’s Presidential Primaries in the Build-Up to 2023 General Elections in Nigeria

E. Dzarma, N. Nyor, I. Usamot · International Journal of Development Mathematics (IJDM) · 2024

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