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Research Article Open access CC BY 4.0

Examining the Moderating Effect of Board Independence on Ownership Structure and Corporate Risk: A Case Study of Nairobi Securities Exchange

Joab Ooko, Cyrus Iraya, Joshua Wanjare, Nixon Omoro

Asian Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting · pp. 298–307 · Published 7 Mar 2024

10.9734/ajeba/2024/v24i41281

Abstract

Corporate governance and the risk management are the integral components of modern business management. This research paper aimed at investigating how and whether the presence of independent directors on the board influences  the relationship between ownership structure and  corporate risk. The composition and independence of a company's board of directors play a crucial role in determining the level of corporate risk. This research delved into the intricate dynamics between these elements to understand how they influence corporate risk. Specifically, the research aimed to examine how board independence acts as a moderating factor on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk. By examining the Kenyan context, this study contributes to the broader understanding of corporate governance in emerging markets. The paper relied on Agency Theory, Mean Variance-Portfolio Theoryagency theory ,mean variance-portfolio theory, the stewardship theory and resource dependence theory (RDT). The research employed use of causal research design. The study population was sixty-four (64) firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange as at 31st December 2021. Secondary data sources included financial reports, annual reports, and surveys. Data analysis was conducted using quantitative techniques like mean, standard deviation and regression, with the help of statistical software STATA. The statistical results revealed significant moderating effect of board independence on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk. The findings have offered practical insights to corporate managers, investors, policymakers, and researchers, aiding them in making informed decisions and formulating effective governance and risk management strategies.

Boards independence ownership structure corporate risks corporate governance

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Cited by 1

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Huxing Li, Cheng Zhou, Yixin Ling · Finance Research Letters · 2025

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