Approach and Application of the Rational Choice Theory in Decisions, Interests and Preferences of the Active Players in the Migration Crisis (2014-18): the Interactive Role of the European Union and the Turkish Policy

Abstract

The 2014 refugee crisis has led to a crisis of trust among the institutions and the leaders of the European Union (E.U) as a supra-national political instrument. Furthermore, it highlighted the disadvantageous condition of the E.U is, such as deficits in humanitarian and democratic ideals, in solidarity among member states, and the consequences of strengthened nationalistic and xenophobic stereotypes. It is claimed that an initially apparent institutional failure was just a transitional stage of an ongoing strategic game oriented by choices and preferences of the dominant players. Thus, the refugee crisis management was guided by multiple nested games, national priorities and political competition themes under the goal of achieving the premium objectives of each player. Hence, the management of the crisis formed a field against collective expression of common European political objectives, confirming the rationality of the individual (national) motivation based on a hierarchy of preferences. The aim of the present article is to analyse, within the scope of the rational choice theory, the strategic choices and the decisions of the member states, as well as to highlight the complexity of the refugee crisis, which in parallel with the economic crisis, contributed to the questioning of the E.U’s power in its core formation.