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Research Article Open access CC BY 4.0

Non-pecuniary Factors in Work Incentive Models: Social Preference and Social Esteem Approaches

Akinori Tomohara, Akihiko Ohno

Journal of Economics, Management and Trade · pp. 1–13 · Published 10 Sep 2014

10.9734/BJEMT/2015/13117

Abstract

This study examines the relevance of different approaches related to non-pecuniary factors by distinguishing positive from negative work attitudes (e.g., effort and shirking). Using survey data, we quantify the relative importance of several human resource management practices. Results show that the social esteem approach, including pride and shame, is more prevalent than the social preference approach, including reciprocity and fairness, with respect to effort. However, the latter approach is as important as the former approach with respect to shirking. These results are robust, irrespective of gender. Distinguishing the context of work incentives, either effort or shirking, is crucially important when discussing the effects of non-pecuniary factors.  

Effort equity work incentives pride reciprocity shirking

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